The course explored the meaning of poetry, the nature of technology, the relationship between ancient Greece and modern Germany, the essence of politics, and human dwelling. Heidegger was only able to deliver two-thirds of the written text of the lecture course. He extends this reading, modifying it in subtle ways. Part one: Poetising the essence of the rivers[ edit ] The Ister hymn[ edit ] The lecture course opens with a reflection on the Greek origin of the word " hymn ," meaning song of praise, specifically in praise of the gods, the heroes, or contest victors, in preparation of the festival. What could it mean to call, or to have the vocation for such a calling, given that the dawn will come whether it is called or not? And what is meant by "Now," by naming the time of such a calling?
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The course explored the meaning of poetry, the nature of technology, the relationship between ancient Greece and modern Germany, the essence of politics, and human dwelling.
Heidegger was only able to deliver two-thirds of the written text of the lecture course. He extends this reading, modifying it in subtle ways.
Part one: Poetising the essence of the rivers[ edit ] The Ister hymn[ edit ] The lecture course opens with a reflection on the Greek origin of the word " hymn ," meaning song of praise, specifically in praise of the gods, the heroes, or contest victors, in preparation of the festival. What could it mean to call, or to have the vocation for such a calling, given that the dawn will come whether it is called or not?
And what is meant by "Now," by naming the time of such a calling? From these questions Heidegger is drawn to ask what it means to "poetise," answering that poetising is always inaugurating something, that genuine poetising is always poetising "anew.
On the one hand, the rivers are detached from human being, having their own "spirit"; on the other hand, the rivers are a locale at which human beings find their dwelling place. The question is thus that of the poetic essence of the river. According to the metaphysical interpretation, art presents objects in nature such as rivers, but this presentation is at the service of something else, of their "meaning" in the artwork. Heidegger speaks in this regard of the etymology of the words " allegory " and " metaphor.
And according to this interpretation the artwork exists not for itself, not as a sensuous object, but for the nonsensuous and suprasensuous, which is also named "spirit. Even the poet knows only that the river flows, but not what is decided in that flowing.
As such, the river is what brings human beings into their own and maintains them there. Yet what is their own often remains foreign to human beings for a long time, and can be abandoned by them because it threatens to overwhelm them.
It is not something that produces itself, but must come to be appropriate, and needs to be appropriated. The river is of assistance in the becoming-homely of human beings, but this "assistance" is not an occasional support but a steadfast standing by. Yet as full of intimation, the rivers proceed into what is coming. But Heidegger relates this to Raten, giving counsel, and to Rat, counsel, but also "care. That the river is an enigma does not mean it is a puzzle we should wish to "solve.
Whatever is subject to order must be posited in advance in such a way that it becomes accessible for order and control. Hence, for example, the reduction to co-ordinates. Yet for calculative observation, something is what it is only through what it performs. All modern thinking thinks in terms of order and performance.
Human activity is thought as labour, equated with mechanical energy, and assessed according to the performative principle. Through such thinking space and time come to be considered so obvious as not to require any further thought. Modern technology is different from every tool.
Whereas the tool is a means, what is distinctive about modern technology is that this is no longer the case, and that it is instead unfolding a domination of its own. It demands its own kind of discipline and conquest. Thus, for example, the staged accomplishment of factories built for the purpose of fabricating machine tools for other factories. Modern machine technology is a specific kind of "truth.
This, however, is a misunderstanding grounded in a failure to grasp the essence of modern technology. And this results from failing to question that which underpins it—the order and unity of "space and time. Yet neither can we conclude that they are merely subjective.
Is space, over which wars erupt, merely imaginary? And is time, which tears us along and tears us away, merely subjective? Space and time comprise the framework for our calculative domination and ordering of the "world" through technology.
But it remains undecided whether this process is turning human beings into mere planetary adventurers, or whether it is the beginning of another tendency, toward new forms of settlement and resettlement. Like "Der Ister," the ode begins with a call to the dawning sun, yet it is clear the ode is equally concerned with darkness.
Although the ode is concerned with the light and darkness of human being, this should not be interpreted to mean that the two main figures, Creon and Antigone, form an opposition. Each of these figures proceed from out of the unity of essence and nonessence, but differently in each case.
Heidegger translates this as das Unheimliche, the uncanny. Heidegger emphasises what he calls the "counterturning" character of the term. Deinon, he says, means the fearful, the powerful, and the inhabitual. But none of these definitional elements is one-dimensional. As the fearful, the deinon is also that which, as worthy of honour, can awaken awe.
As the powerful, it may be that which looms over us, or that which is merely violent. As the inhabitual, the extraordinary, the extraordinariness of skill, it exceeds the ordinary, but it can do so as that which governs the ordinary and the habitual. As das Unheimliche, deinon names the unity of all these meanings. The extraordinariness of human being is this being un-homely that is also a becoming homely. Heidegger makes clear that this being unhomely does not mean simply homelessness, wandering around, adventurousness, or lack of rootedness.
Rather, it means that the sea and the land are those realms that human beings transform through skillfulness and use. The homely is that which is striven for in the violent activity of passing through the inhabitual. Yet even so, the homely is not attained in this activity: as the ode says, man "comes to nothing. Infinitely skillful and artful, human beings nevertheless can never circumvent death. This is something known by human beings, but mostly in the form of evading this knowledge.
Human beings are in fact those beings which comport themselves to beings as such, and because they understand being, human beings alone can also forget being.
The uncanniness of human beings is that they alone are capable of "catastrophe," in the sense of a reversal turning them away from their own essence. The "political" is conventionally understood in terms of consciousness, in a "technical" manner, as the way in which history is accomplished.
It is thus marked by a failure to question itself. Perhaps the polis is that around which everything question-worthy and uncanny turns in an exceptional way. Heidegger uses the word Wirbel, swirl, in this context, and speaks of the polis as essentially "polar. Human being bears within it this potential for reversal, a potential essentially grounded in the possibility of being mistaken, of taking nonbeings for beings and beings for nonbeings.
Thus human beings are creatures of risk. They seek to become homely within a site, place everything at stake in this, and encounter the fact that the homely refuses itself to them. Human beings do not themselves make themselves the most uncanny thing; it is not a matter of self-consciousness here. Only because human beings can say "it is," Heidegger says, can they say "I am. It is the distinction of human beings, in other words, to "see" the open.
If we were to interpret this as a rejection of Creon, according to Heidegger, then the choral ode would not be a "high song of culture" so much as a song in praise of mediocrity, of hatred toward the exception.
To interpret otherwise than this means asking where Antigone herself stands in relation to the deinon. Antigone, in other words, takes the impossible as her point of departure.
She says herself that she wishes to suffer or bear the uncanny. In this she is removed from all human possibilities, and is the supreme uncanny. The chorus speaks not only of expulsion, but of "not sharing their delusion with my knowing.
The content of this knowing is not stated directly, but it is, however, referred to as a phronein, a meditating from the heart. If this knowledge takes the form of intimation, it is not mere opinion. Thinking is not the sediment left after the demythologising of myth. The expulsion referred to in the closing words of the choral ode is not a rejection of the unhomely, as much as an impulsion to be attentive to the homely, to risk belonging to it.
Being unhomely is a not yet awakened, not yet decided, potential for being homely. Hence at stake in her action is the most uncanny risk. The closing words of the ode call in the direction of a knowledge of the proper essence of the unhomely one.
In this most enigmatic part of his interpretation, Heidegger speaks of "the risk of distinguishing and deciding between that being unhomely proper to human beings and a being unhomely that is inappropriate.
Antigone, he says, is herself the purest poem. The human potential for being, and the unhomely being homely of human beings upon the earth, is poetic. What is spoken in the choral ode remains indeterminate, but neither vague nor arbitrary. The indeterminate is, on the contrary, that which is undecided yet first to be decided.
If this is the case, then the tragedy poetises that which is in the highest sense worthy of poetising. What spirit thinks is that which is fittingly destined for human beings, yet this is always that which is futural, never something that has been decided; it is something "non-actual" that is already "acting. At the beginning of the history of a people, their destiny is assigned, but what has been assigned is in coming; it is still veiled and equivocal. Thus in spirit there prevails the longing for its own essence.
But "spirit loves colony," that is, in the foreign it wills the mother who is difficult to attain. It is in this way that the law of being unhomely is the law of becoming homely. What was proper to the Greeks was "the fire from the heavens"; what was foreign was the "clarity of presentation.
For the Germans, on the other hand, the clarity of presentation is natural—the formation of projects, frameworks, etc. What is foreign is the fire from heaven, and thus they must learn to be struck by this fire, and thereby impelled to the correct appropriation of their gift for presentation. Otherwise they shall be exposed to the weakness of suppressing every fire, of pursuing delimitation and institution only for the sake of it. It can be achieved only on the basis of a "dwelling" which can be seized upon through making or achieving within the realm of the actual.
Dwelling, the becoming homely of a being unhomely, is grounded in the poetic. There must be a poet who poetises in advance the essence of poetry.
HEIDEGGER DER ISTER PDF
Through such thinking space and time come to be considered so obvious as geidegger to require any further thought. It is not the everyday mind. Otherwise they shall be exposed to the weakness of suppressing every fire, of pursuing delimitation and institution only for the sake of it. Customers who bought this item also bought.