Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism Derk Pereboom Abstract This book explores how physicalism might best defended and formulated. Two responses to the knowledge and conceivability arguments are set out. The first draws on the open possibility that introspective representations fail to represent mental states as they are in themselves. More specifically, introspection represents phenomenal properties as having certain characteristic qualitative natures, and it may be that these properties really lack such features. The seriousness of this open possibility is enhanced by an analogy with our perceptual representations of secondary qualities. Our vision r
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Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism Derk Pereboom Philosophy of Mind This book offers a new sort of response to the knowledge and conceivability arguments that features a limited kind of representational error. Pereboom provides a historically informed development of the Russellian monist view that known physical relational properties are underlain by currently unknown fundamental intrinsic properties.
Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism Derk Pereboom Philosophy of Mind Description In this book, Derk Pereboom explores how physicalism might best be formulated and defended against the best anti-physicalist arguments.
Two responses to the knowledge and conceivability arguments are set out and developed. The first exploits the open possibility that introspective representations fail to represent mental properties as they are in themselves; specifically, that introspection represents phenomenal properties as having certain characteristic qualitative natures, which these properties might actually lack. The second response draws on the proposal that currently unknown fundamental intrinsic properties provide categorical bases for known physical properties and would also yield an account of consciousness.
While there are non-physicalist versions of this position, some are amenable to physicalism. The type of nonreductivism endorsed departs from others in that it rejects all token identity claims for psychological and microphysical entities.
The deepest relation between the mental and the microphysical is constitution, where this relation is not to be explicated by the notion of identity.
Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism Derk Pereboom.
Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism
Search Menu This is an excellent book. The first four chapters develop a distinctive physicalist response to the knowledge and conceivability arguments, which centres on qualitative inaccuracy — the idea that introspection might misrepresent experiences as having phenomenal natures that they lack. The next two chapters develop an alternative response based on Russellian monism. Both responses are consistent with a theory Pereboom expounds in chapters eight and nine: robust non-reductive physicalism. I will focus on the responses. But first let me briefly describe his positive view. On robust non-reductive physicalism, mental phenomena are constituted by neural or microphysical phenomena.
CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE PROSPECTS OF PHYSICALISM PDF
I will devote a section to each of its three main themes. Request removal from index. Science Logic and Mathematics. In recent decades prowpects number of arguments have emerged designed to show that physicalist theories of mind cannot do justice to the nature of consciousness. By Derk Pereboom — PhilPapers No one so far as I know claims that the former are conscious in any but the most attenuated sense, as that would entail attributing unattenuated consciousness to the inanimate world.