Before the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War, he was a Syrian businessman. Suweiss was a former paratrooper officer in the Syrian military, and was jailed in for his alleged membership in an outlawed Islamist organization. He was released in an amnesty deal at the beginning of the uprising. The UAE, Lebanon, and Iraq support classifying Liwa al-Haqq as a terrorist organization, but they have not been able to achieve a unanimous consensus.
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This is its first time appearing in English. The following post was written in the wake of the initial trial that was held in July The aim of the following piece is to make a brief synthesis of the key questions that have arisen during the trial on the issues of online jihad: What was the precise role of these cyber-activists? How should one assess the reach of their influence, between transmission of the dogma, popularization of the ideology, and information sharing on the one side, and the operational use of the internet to support jihad, the incentive to take part in it or to carry out an attack on the other side?
The stake for the parties was the qualification of facts, between glorification of terrorism and terrorist conspiracy. The Court ruled for the terrorist conspiracy and sentenced the defendants to 3 to 5 years of imprisonment. In addition, F. Ben Abbes was sentenced to permanent exclusion from French territory. The issue of the operational use of the internet for terrorist purposes is all the more crucial as this utilisation has been expanding ever since, with the now widespread employment of encrypted messaging apps.
For instance, Telegram, due to its aggregating the functionalities of host, social media, and encrypted messaging application is a platform of choice to replicate some support functions of jihad in the digital space.
This is true both from an offensive perspective i. Where should the line be drawn between dogma dissemination, the exegesis of jihadist ideology, and the call for jihad? Can the sharing or translation of ideological texts such as those of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi , one of the most influential clerics and theorists in the jihadist intellectual sphere, likely reinforce radicalisation, perhaps even generate it, and prompt an individual towards violent action?
In the first place, these questions involve media activists themselves, for whom the permeability between digital and real jihad was substantiated. This permeability showcases the blurry boundary that may exist between digital activism and operational commitment: the close link between propaganda and operations as part of a whole is indeed materialised at the highest level of jihadist groups—be it ISIS or al-Qaeda—that incorporate their media branches within the command leadership.
The prosecution argued that translating content and making it available to non-Arabic nor English-speaking audiences was a way of promoting this content to French-speaking audiences, so that they could apprehend it and familiarise themselves with its rhetoric. This potential affiliation raises the subsidiary question of the complex media ecosystem linked to a specific terror group and the continuum between core media of this group, affiliated outlets, supporter media, and groups or individuals a more neutral stance sharing content.
That positioning of the forum host vs. Should the task of defining a perimeter around acceptable or licit content fall on these platforms and the private sector, or is it a state prerogative?
The Importance of Digital Evidences Some elements of the case relied on digital evidence, including the number and frequency of messages, identification of their authors, and evidence of file deletion.
This digital evidences has become harder to obtain over the last number of years due to the broader use of encrypted messaging applications and secure email services, along with growing awareness of anonymity and privacy tactics and tools. Currently prominent are issues of non- cooperation between the private sector i.
By ruling in favour of the terrorist criminal conspiracy, the Court acknowledged the impact that media jihad may trigger. Notwithstanding the migration of media jihad from websites and forums to social media and encrypted messaging applications as the main dissemination channels, the issues mentioned above remain topical.
Of course, remote-controlled terrorism, that involves only online links between the perpetrator s of an attack and its planner s , is a more advanced type of virtualisation of terrorist action , which has already occurred. You can follow her on Twitter: LoBindner.
ANSAR AL HAQQ PDF
The group later made an allegiance to al-Qaeda and allegedly received direct funds from the terror network. During its stay in the Biyara region near the Iranian border, there were allegations of logistical support from "powerful factions in Iran". They received the message from bin Laden that Kurdish Islamic cells should unite. The attacks allowed the AAI to carve out space to impose its form of Islamist governance in northeast Iraq under its spiritual founder and leader Mullah Krekar. Sharia Law was implemented, enforcing it through bombing of businesses it deemed in-Islamic, acid attacks on women it deemed immodest and beheading of those it deemed apostates.
Liwa al-Haqq (Homs)
Moogukus He was released in an amnesty deal at the beginning of the uprising. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. Thomas Reuters, 17 Feb. The Politics of the Islamic Front, Part 1: It is not hidden from anyone that the goals of the majority of factions are like our goals. Liwa al-Haqq was not a designated terrorist organization. Liwa al-Haqq opposed the Assad Regime.